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INSINCERE APOLOGIES: THE TENTH
CIRCUIT'S TREATMENT OF
COMPELLED SPEECH IN PUBLIC HIGH
SCHOOLS
Nora Sullivan*
As one of fifteen valedictorians at Lewis Palmer High
School in Monument, Colorado, Erica Corder was given the
opportunity to address her classmates briefly at their 2006
graduation.' All of the valedictorians' speeches were approved
• • 2
prior to graduation day by the high school's principal. At the
graduation ceremony, Corder's speech started in a typical manner,
expressing gratitude to teachers, parents, and peers who had
offered her support. Corder then veered from the principal-
approved wording of her speech and expressed her appreciation for
Jesus Christ.3 She urged the audience, "If you don't already know
Him personally I encourage you to find out more about the
sacrifice He made for you so that you now have the opportunity to
live in eternity with Him.",
4
* Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2011:
Master's Student, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of
Journalism and Mass Communication, 2011. The author thanks Dr. Cathy
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1. Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist., 566 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir.
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 742 (2009).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. The full text of Corder's graduation speech, as delivered at the
ceremony, is as follows:
Throughout these lessons our teachers, parents, and let's
not forget our peers have supported and encouraged us
along the way. Thank you all for the past four amazing
years. Because of your love and devotion to our success,
we have all learned how to endure change and remain
strong individuals. We are all capable of standing firm and
expressing our own beliefs, which is why I need to tell you
about someone who loves you more than you could ever
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After the graduation ceremony, Corder was escorted to the
assistant principal's office and informed that she would have to
schedule an appointment with the principal. When Corder and her
parents met with the principal, Corder was told that she would not
receive her diploma unless she apologized for her graduation
speech.5 The principal later conditioned issuing Corder's diploma
on her addition of this sentence to the version of the apology that
she drafted: "I realize that, had I asked ahead of time, I would not
have been allowed to say what I did."6 Corder agreed and received
her diploma after the apology was disseminated by the principal's
office via e-mail to the school community.7 After this incident,
Corder filed a lawsuit alleging, among other things, that the school
district violated her First Amendment rights by forcing her to issue
an apology in order to receive her diploma.
imagine. He died for you on a cross over 2,000 years ago,
yet was resurrected and is living today in heaven. His
name is Jesus Christ. If you don't already know Him
personally I encourage you to find out more about the
sacrifice He made for you so that you now have the
opportunity to live in eternity with Him. And we also
encourage you, now that we are all ready to encounter the
biggest change in our lives thus far, the transition from
childhood to adulthood, to leave Lewis-Palmer with
confidence and integrity. Congratulations class of 2006.
Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1223. The full text of Corder's draft apology is as follows:
At graduation, I know some of you may have been
offended by what I said during the valedictorian speech. I
did not intend to offend anyone. I also want to make it
clear that [the principal] did not condone nor was he
aware of my plans before giving the speech. I'm sorry I
didn't share my plans with [the principal] or the other
valedictorians ahead of time. The valedictorians were not
aware of what I was going to say. These were my personal
beliefs and may not necessarily reflect the beliefs of the





The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that
the school district did not violate Corder's First Amendment rights
by compelling her to apologize, because the apology was related to
a "legitimate pedagogical purpose." 9 The Tenth Circuit rested its
conclusion on the notion that if a school can censor speech, then a
school can also compel an apology in instances where a student
ignores the school's censorship."' By using the same standards for
censored and compelled speech in public schools, the court failed
fully to consider the differences that exist between the First
Amendment protections against compulsion and censorship.
The purpose of this Note is to explore the issue of
compelled speech in public high schools by examining the Tenth
Circuit's opinion in Corder v. Lewis Palmer School District and the
underlying case law. This is an important topic because it has not
been fully addressed in scholarly literature and, although the
Supreme Court ultimately denied Corder's petition for a writ of
certiorari, clear First Amendment standards for compelled student
speech have not yet been announced by the Court.
In Part I, this Note reviews the Supreme Court student
speech cases and analyzes the Tenth Circuit's holding on the
censorship issue in Corder." In Part II, this Note reviews the
Supreme Court compelled speech cases, analyzes the Tenth
Circuit's holding on the compelled speech issue in Corder, and
discusses several distinguishing characteristics of the compelled
speech in that case that the court should have considered. 2 In Part
9. Id. at 1231.
10. Id.
11. This paper discusses the First Amendment protections only for public
high school students and does not analyze the protections available to students
in private schools or to college students. The Court has recognized that
college students have greater First Amendment protections than high school
students. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (finding that college
students, unlike high school students, are entitled to full First Amendment
protection). Also, this analysis is restricted to public-rather than private-
schools, because censorship and compulsion in private schools do not involve
state action and, thus, do not trigger a First Amendment analysis.
12. Cases addressing the issue of compelled commercial speech were
omitted from this analysis because the Court has recognized different First
Amendment standards for commercial speech. See, e.g., Johanns v. Livestock
2010] 535
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Ill, this Note concludes by proposing that the Corder court should
have applied the Supreme Court precedents on compelled speech,
rather those on student speech, in that case.
I. THE SCHOOL DISTRICT'S POWER TO CENSOR
CORDER'S SPEECH
Corder raised several claims against the school district
based on the graduation incident. First, Corder alleged that the
school district violated her First Amendment right to freedom of
speech by requiring her to submit her speech to the principal for
review prior to graduation. 13 The court concluded that the school
was free to review Corder's speech prior to the event because the
graduation ceremony was a school-sponsored event and Corder's
speech was "'reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns. ' 4 The court built on this finding to establish a test for
the constitutionality of the principal's order compelling Corder to
apologize after she delivered her speech. This section will briefly
examine the relevant Supreme Court holdings on censorship of
public high school students' speech and the Tenth Circuit's
application of these rules to the facts in Corder. The analysis that
follows will demonstrate that Supreme Court precedent supports
the Tenth Circuit's holding on the censorship issue. However, the
Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 557 (2005) (distinguishing between "true
'compelled-speech' cases, in which an individual is obliged by the government
personally to express a message with which he disagrees; and 'compelled-
subsidy' cases, in which an individual is required by the government to
subsidize a message he disagrees with, expressed by a private entity.").
13. Corder, 566 F.3d at 1223. Corder raised several claims in addition to
the censored and compelled speech issues. She alleged that the school district
violated the First Amendment's freedom of religion and Establishment
clauses, the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection, and a Colorado
statute protecting the free expression rights of public school students. Id. The
Tenth Circuit rejected Corder's freedom of religion, equal protection, and
state law claims. Id. at 1232-36. Corder did not pursue the Establishment
Clause claim on appeal. Id. at 1223 n.1. This paper will focus only on the
Tenth Circuit's analysis of the censored and compelled speech issues.
14. Id. at 1229 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,
273 (1988)).
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Tenth Circuit's reliance on the censorship cases to support its
holding on the compelled speech issue is less convincing.
The Corder court began its analysis of the censorship claim
by reviewing the precedents established by the Supreme Court in
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,
1 5
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,16 Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier,17 and Morse v. Frederick." The court also
relied on binding Tenth Circuit precedent related to student speech
rights.' 9 Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit relied on the student speech
standard established in Hazelwood, rather than the more speech-
protective standard in Tinker, in its analysis of the censorship
issue."'
In Tinker, the Court held that the First Amendment
protected public high school students' right to wear black armbands
in protest of the Vietnam War." While recognizing the "special
characteristics of the school environment, 22 the Tinker Court
stated that student speech may only be curtailed if the speech
threatens to cause a material interference or a substantial
disruption with school activities.23 The Court's seemingly broad
protection of student speech in Tinker was limited by three
24
subsequent opinions.
15. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
16. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
17. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
18. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
19. Corder, 566 F.3d at 1228-30 (discussing and applying Fleming v.
Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002)).
20. Id. at 1226-30.
21. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514
(1969).
22. Id. at 506.
23. Id. at 509.
24. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007) (holding that a
school district did not violate the First Amendment by punishing a student
who displayed a banner that read "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" at an off-campus
school-sponsored event); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,
276 (1988) (holding that a school district did not violate the First Amendment
by refusing to print a story about teen pregnancy and a story about divorce in
a newspaper published by students and supported with funds from the board
of education); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 690 (1986)
2010] INSINCERE A POLO0GIES
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In one of these cases, Hazelwood, the Court held that a
school district did not violate the First Amendment by refusing to
print a story about teen pregnancy and a story about divorce in a
newspaper published by students and supported with funds from
the board of education.25 The Court distinguished Hazelwood from
Tinker by noting that the former dealt with a situation where the
school was being asked to promote the student's speech, namely by
publishing the articles in dispute, rather than simply to tolerate
student speech. 26  In Hazelwood, the Court established a new
standard for determining when a school may properly censor
student speech without violating the First Amendment. According
to the Hazelwood Court, a school may censor school-sponsored
student speech27 when the censorship is "reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns."2"
The Corder court announced that it would apply the
Hazelwood standard and cited another Tenth Circuit case in
support of its use of that standard.29 In Fleming v. Jefferson County
(holding that the First Amendment did not bar a school district from
suspending a student for giving a sexually suggestive speech at a school
assembly); see also, e.g., Clay Calvert, Tinker's Midlife Crisis: Tattered and
Transgressed but Still Standing, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1167, 1172 (2009) (arguing
that Tinker should be strengthened and followed and that the Supreme Court
should stop the practice of finding exceptions to Tinker); Erwin Chemerinsky,
How Will Morse v. Frederick be Applied?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 17, 22-
26 (2008) (noting that Morse follows the Court's recent trend of siding with
schools rather than students in First Amendment cases, but arguing that lower
courts should focus on Justice Alito's concurrence which may limit the
application of Morse); Douglas Laycock, High-Value Speech and the Basic
Educational Mission of a Public Schook Some Preliminary Thoughts, 12 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 111, 112 (2008) (noting that the Court's post-Tinker
opinions have caused confusion regarding the First Amendment protection for
student speech, but arguing that political and religious speech are so
fundamental that they must be protected).
25. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 263.
26. Id. at 270-71.
27. School-sponsored speech is that which "students, parents, and
members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of
the school." Id. at 271.
28. Id. at 273.
29. Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist., 566 F.3d 1219, 1229 (10th Cir.
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 742 (2009).
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School District R-1,3' the Tenth Circuit upheld a school's guidelines
for selecting which tiles created as part of an art project in the wake
of the Columbine High School shootings would be affixed to the
walls of the school.3 The Tenth Circuit in Fleming relied on the
Hazelwood standard, finding that the expression on the tiles
constituted school-sponsored speech because the school exercised
control over the selection and creation of the tiles.3 2 The Corder
court found that the Hazelwood standard also applied in Corder
because, like Fleming, the graduation speech was school-
sponsored. 3  The Tenth Circuit explained:
We resolve this case by first asking: is the
"expressive activity" at issue-a valedictory
speech at graduation-a "school-sponsored...
expressive activit[y] that students, parents, and
members of the public might reasonably
perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school"?
If so, then a valedictory speech at graduation is
school-sponsored speech, and the School
30. 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002).
31. The court noted that the teachers in charge of the art project received
specific instructions: "To assure that the interior of the building would remain
a positive learning environment and not become a memorial to the tragedy, [a
CHS administrator] directed that there could be no references to the attack, to
the date of the attack, April 20, 1999, or 4/20/93, [sic] no names or initials of
students, no Columbine ribbons, no religious symbols, and nothing obscene or
offensive." Id. at 921.
32. Id. at 923-24.
33. Corder, 566 F.3d at 1229. Arguably, the school district in Fleming
exercised far more control over the art project than the school district in
Corder exercised over the valedictory speech. In Fleming, the school
undertook the tasks of authorizing the art project and creating written
guidelines, soliciting participants, supervising participants while they painted
tiles, screening and selecting tiles, and overseeing the affixture of the selected
tiles to the walls of the school. Fleming, 298 F.3d at 921-22. In Corder, the
school undertook the tasks of: holding a graduation ceremony, a common
practice; selecting graduation speakers, based solely on their grade point
averages; and instituting an unwritten policy of reviewing these speeches prior
to the ceremony. Corder, 566 F.3d at 1222. Despite the different levels of
control exercised in Fleming and Corder, courts have consistently applied the
Hazelwood standard to graduation speeches. See cases cited infra note 37.
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District did not violate the "First Amendment
by exercising editorial control over the style
and content of student speech in school-
sponsored expressive activities so long as their
actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns. 34
The Corder court's reliance on Hazelwood, rather than the
more speech-permissive standard in Tinker, was premised on the
fear that people might believe the school endorsed the graduation
speeches.35 The court found that the graduation speech was school-
sponsored because the school organized and supervised the
ceremony, selected the speakers based on their grade point
36averages, and reviewed the speeches prior to the ceremony. This
finding is consistent with other federal courts' opinions that
34. Corder, 566 F.3d at 1229 (citations omitted). The Corder court noted
that a "court should appraise the level of involvement the school had in
organizing or supervising the contested speech" in order to determine if the
speech was school-sponsored. Id. at 1228. The court explained further that
"pedagogical" refers to any concern that is "related to learning." Id. (quoting
Fleming, 298 F.3d at 925).
35. Id. at 1229. But see Laycock. supra note 24, at 129. Laycock contends
that censorship of student religious speech, which is arguably one type of
speech at the heart of the First Amendment, remains the type of speech that
still receives strong protection under Tinker:
Religious speech, like political speech, is at the core of the
First Amendment. We can infer this relationship textually,
from the explicit constitutional protections for religion in
the same sentence with the Free Speech Clause. And we
can infer it historically. In the early modern era, when the
idea of free speech was struggling for acceptance, Europe
was embroiled in religious conflict growing out of the
Reformation, and the speech that governments most
wanted to suppress was very often religious speech.
Schools cannot constitutionally interpret their basic
educational mission as requiring the suppression of
religious speech.
Id. at 123-24. The Tenth Circuit, however, held that the school district's policy
was neutral and generally applicable; thus, the district did not violate Corder's
right to the free exercise of religion by forcing her to issue an apology.
Corder, 566 F.3d at 1232-33.
36. Corder, 566 F.3d at 1229.
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similarly have held that graduation speeches are school sponsored,
thus, justifying the application of lower First Amendment
protections under Hazelwood.37
The Corder court next addressed the issue of whether the
school district's policy of reviewing commencement speeches was
reasonably related to pedagogical concerns as required by the
Hazelwood analysis." Generally, courts applying the "legitimate
pedagogical concerns" prong of the Hazelwood test are extremely
deferential to school districts, favoring the permission of
censorship. 9 The Tenth Circuit noted that in order to satisfy this
requirement, the policy merely needed to be "'related to
37. See Lassonde v. Pleasanton Unified Sch. Dist., 320 F.3d 979, 985 (9th
Cir. 2003) ("[T]he essence of graduation is to place the school's imprimatur on
the ceremony-including the student speakers that the school selected.");
Nurre v. Whitehead, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1238 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (holding
that a performance of "Ave Maria" at a high school graduation "would have
borne the imprimatur of the school" because the school exercised control over
the ceremony); Lundberg v. West Monona Cmty. Sch. Dist., 731 F. Supp. 331,
339 (N.D. Iowa 1989) (holding that a school district could refuse to allow a
pastor to give a prayer during a high school graduation and noting that "the
School Board here has a real and legitimate concern that prayer at a school-
run function may work to stamp the belief in God with the imprimatur of the
school and of the state"). See generally Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 597
(1992) ( "[A]t a high school graduation, teachers and principals must and do
retain a high degree of control over the precise contents of the program, the
speeches, the timing, the movements, the dress, and the decorum of the
students.").
38. Corder, 566 F.3d at 1230.
39. See Brody v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1122 (3d Cir. 1992) ("[Elven
though commencement exercises are arguably not part of the educational
curriculum, Hazelwood stands for the proposition that school officials are to
be accorded broad discretion in regulating speech in all school forums that are
non-public."). See generally Joseph 0. Oluwole, The Genesis of Gangrenes in
the Student Free Speech Taxonomy, 13 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 299, 315
(2009) (noting that Hazelwood "developed a very lenient standard for schools
seeking to wield control over student speech: schools can censor school-
sponsored student speech"); S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Teaching the New Three Rs
- Repression, Rights, and Respect: A Primer of Student Speech Activities, 37
B.C. L. REV. 119, 140-42 (1995) (discussing the trend of courts to uphold most
restrictions of student speech under the Hazelwood framework).
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learning. ' "4 The court concluded that graduation speeches are
related to learning because they present "an opportunity for the
school district to impart lessons on discipline, courtesy, and respect
for authority."'' 4  After finding that censorship of graduation
speeches was based on a "legitimate pedagogical concern," the
Tenth Circuit held that the school district's unwritten policy of
reviewing graduation speeches did not violate Corder's First
Amendment right to free speech.42
Given the general trend toward applying the Hazelwood
test to graduation speeches43 and the deferential nature of that
44
standard toward school districts, the Tenth Circuit's holding on
the censorship issue in Corder is supported by current case law.45
After reaching this holding on the censored speech issue, the court
built on this by applying the same Hazelwood standard to find that
the principal had the power to compel an apology.46 The next
40. Corder, 566 F.3d at 1228 (quoting Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch.
Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 925 (10th Cir. 2002)).
41. Id. at 1229.
42. Id. at 1230.
43. See cases cited supra note 37.
44. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. But see Josie Foehrenbach
Brown, Representative Tension: Student Religious Speech and the Public
School's Institutional Mission, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 67 (2009) (arguing that
Corder's speech was not "school-sponsored" within the meaning of
Hazelwood because a valedictorian is clearly not "the school's delegate
delivering an official message").
45. But see Jay Alan Sekulow, James Henderson & John Tuskey,
Proposed Guidelines for Student Religious Speech and Observance in Public
Schools, 46 MERCER L. REV. 1017 (1995). The authors argued that:
Censoring a valedictory or salutatory speech is especially
odious. The opportunity to give a speech as a
valedictorian or salutatorian is typically an honor given to
a graduating senior to acknowledge four years of work
and academic achievement. To censor or preapprove a
valedictory or salutatory speech is to tell the student, "we
will reward your work by allowing you to address the
graduation audience and give the message we (not you)
think is appropriate."
Id. at 1077.
46. Corder, 566 F.3d at 1231.
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section of this Note will explore the concerns raised by applying the
same First Amendment standard to censorship and compulsion.
II. THE SCHOOL DISTRICT'S POWER TO COMPEL
CORDER'S APOLOGY
While it seems clear that the school district did have the
power to censor Corder's speech based on the standards established
by the Supreme Court for public high school student speech rights,
the Corder court's reasoning regarding the compelled speech issue
is weak, at best, for several reasons. There are four major flaws in
the Corder court's analysis of the compelled speech issue.
First, the court interpreted Supreme Court precedent to
justify its conclusion that the First Amendment grants the same
level of protection against compelling and censoring speech. The
court erred in its reading of those precedents; they do not stand for
the proposition that the same tests should apply to compulsion and
censorship. Rather, they stand only for the proposition that
compelled speech is fully protected under the First Amendment.
Second, the court briefly noted that the power to compel
can be derived from the power to censor. The Corder court cited
only one case to support this finding. In that cited case, the Third
Circuit expressly stated that it was not determining when a school
district may lawfully compel speech.
Third, the court applied the Hazelwood standard to the
facts related to the compelled apology in Corder. In doing this, the
court erroneously applied a standard for assessing the
constitutionality of censoring student speech to government
compulsion of student speech.
Finally, the court's application of the Hazelwood standard
highlights several distinguishing characteristics between compulsion
and censorship, including the difference between the power to
censor and the power to compel speech, the difference between
compelling a response and compelling the adoption of a particular
viewpoint, and the special harms brought about by compelling
speech. Taking these distinguishing characteristics into account, it
is clear that the Tenth Circuit should have applied different First
Amendment standards to compelled and censored student speech.
20101 INSINCERE A POLO0GIES
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A. Misinterpretation of Supreme Court Precedent
The Supreme Court has struck down compelled speech
requirements on First Amendment grounds several times, most
notably in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,47
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,4X Wooley v. Maynard,49
and Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina,"'
and has consistently recognized that the First Amendment protects
"the decision of both what to say and what not to say." 5' In
Barnette, the Court held that the West Virginia State Board of
Education violated the First Amendment by forcing students to
salute the American flag.52 The Court noted that, unlike in the case
of censorship, compelling speech removes two options from the
speaker: the option to remain silent and the option to change his or
53her message. While this case is the only Supreme Court case to
deal directly with the issue of compelled student speech, it was only
mentioned in a footnote in the Corder opinion, to support the
proposition that there is First Amendment protection against the
government-compelled speech.54
Instead of focusing on Barnette, the Corder court found that
"[t]he Supreme Court has long recognized that, for purposes of the
47. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
48. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
49. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
50. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
51. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988).
52. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. In Barnette, the West Virginia State Board
of Education adopted a resolution requiring all public school teachers and
students to salute the flag and stated that refusal to do so would be treated as
an act of insubordination. Several Jehovah's Witnesses were expelled from
school when they refused to salute the flag, a practice that conflicted with their
religious beliefs. Id. at 626-30.
53. Id. at 633-34. The Court noted that the clear-and-present-danger test
was in place for censoring speech at the time of the Barnette opinion and
stated that remaining silent during a flag salute did not appear to present a
clear and present danger. Therefore, the Court reasoned, "[ilt would seem
that involuntary affirmation could be commanded only on even more
immediate and urgent grounds than silence." Id. at 633.
54. Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist., 566 F.3d 1219, 1230 n.7 (10th Cir.
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 742 (2009).
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First Amendment, forced speech is no different than censored
speech."5 In order to support this proposition, the court cited the
Supreme Court's opinions in Tornillo and Riley. In Tornillo, the
Court dealt with Florida's right-to-reply statute, which required
newspapers to publish a response when they criticized a political
candidate. The Tornillo Court noted that the statute, which
compelled speech, "operates as a command in the same sense as a
statute or regulation forbidding [the newspaper] to publish a
specified matter., 5 7 The Court went on to explain that because of
the costs associated with printing a reply, the statute served as a
disincentive for editors to publish news or commentary on political
candidates.8 By avoiding the topic altogether, the newspapers
would never risk invoking the statute and being forced to publish a
reply from a candidate. 9 Tornillo does not suggest that the First
Amendment allows the government to compel speech in situations
where the government also has the power to censor speech.
Rather, the Court noted that the particular statute in that case not
only compelled speech, but also may have had the effect of chilling
speech.60
The Tenth Circuit also relied on Riley to justify its
treatment of compelled speech. In Riley, the Court held that a
North Carolina law requiring professional fundraisers to disclose to
potential donors the percentage of donations actually turned over
to charities during the course of the past twelve months violated the
First Amendment. 61  The Court noted that it would be
constitutional for the state to publish the same information itself,
but that the First Amendment was violated when the state forced
private actors to do this.
62
55. Id. at 1231.
56. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 243-44 (1974).
57. Id. at 256.
58. Id. at 256-57.
59. Id. at 257.
60. Id. The Court noted that "under the operation of the Florida statute,
political and electoral coverage would be blunted or reduced." Id.
61. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 795-800
(1988).
62. Id. at 800.
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The Riley Court said that both compelling speech and
compelling silence are fully protected against under the First
Amendment. 63  The Court further noted that both compelled
statements of opinion and compelled statements of fact are equally
prohibited. The Riley Court explained:
[W]e would not immunize a law requiring a
speaker favoring a particular government
project to state at the outset of every address
the average cost overruns in similar projects, or
a law requiring a speaker favoring an
incumbent candidate to state during every
solicitation that candidate's recent travel
budget. Although the foregoing factual
information might be relevant to the listener,
and, in the latter case, could encourage or
discourage the listener from making a political
donation, a law compelling its disclosure would
clearly and substantially burden the protected
speech.64
The Corder court never fully explained how it made the
leap from finding that the First Amendment prohibits the
government from compelling speech to the assertion that the First
Amendment standards for censoring student speech also apply to
compelled speech. While both the Tornillo and Riley Courts noted
that compelling speech was prohibited in the same way as censoring
speech, this language only seems to be included in the opinion to
contradict the argument that compulsion does not raise the same
First Amendment concerns as censorship. These Supreme Court
cases do not state that the government is free to compel speech in
all situations where it is able constitutionally to censor speech. In
fact, the Court seems to indicate that when there are available
alternatives, like in Riley, the government's interest in compelling
speech may be given less weight. 65 In Riley, the Court noted that
the government could have published information regarding the
63. Id. at 796-97.
64. Id. at 798.
65. Id. at 800.
546 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW [Vol. 8
amount of money that actually went to charity during the course of
the previous year without requiring the professional fundraisers to
disclose this information during the course of the solicitation 66 In
Corder, the school district could have issued its own notice that
Corder's speech did not reflect the views of the school and that the
delivered speech differed from the version that was pre-approved
by the school's principal. The fact that this alternative was
available, in itself, may support the proposition that while the
school district could have censored the graduation speech in
Corder, once the speech had been delivered, the school district had
means to advance its interests in separating itself from the speech
that would not invoke First Amendment concerns. The Tenth
Circuit fails to acknowledge this distinction when it makes the jump
between the censorship and compulsion issues.
Furthermore, Wooley, a case only cited generally by the
Corder court in the same footnote as the citation to Barnette, is
contrary to the proposition that the power to compel and the power
• 61
to censor are coextensive. In Wooley, the Court held that the
state of New Hampshire could not prosecute Jehovah's Witnesses
66. The Court discussed the importance of the available alternatives:
In contrast to the prophylactic, imprecise, and unduly
burdensome rule the State has adopted to reduce its
alleged donor misperception, more benign and narrowly
tailored options are available. For example, as a general
rule, the State may itself publish the detailed financial
disclosure forms it requires professional fundraisers to
file. This procedure would communicate the desired
information to the public without burdening a speaker
with unwanted speech during the course of a solicitation.
Alternatively, the State may vigorously enforce its
antifraud laws to prohibit professional fundraisers from
obtaining money on false pretenses or by making false
statements. These more narrowly tailored rules are in
keeping with the First Amendment directive that
government not dictate the content of speech absent
compelling necessity, and then, only by means precisely
tailored.
Id.
67. Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist., 566 F.3d 1219, 1230 n.7 (10th Cir.
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 742 (2009).
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for covering up the state's "Live Free or Die" motto on their license
plates when the motto conflicted with the residents' religious
beliefs. 6 In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that "[t]he
right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are
complementary components of the broader concept of 'individual
freedom of mind."' 69 The term complementary has been defined as
"mutually supplying each other's lack."7" Thus, the Supreme
Court's description of compelled speech in Wooley signals that the
First Amendment safeguards against compulsion and censorship
are not the same, but rather are two different pieces of a puzzle that
fit together to form complete protection for free speech.
From a full examination of the Supreme Court precedent on
compelled speech, it is clear that the First Amendment generally
provides broad protections against compelled speech. The issue of
compelled speech in public high schools raises a more complex
problem; this exact topic was directly addressed by the Court only
in Barnette where full First Amendment protection was granted to
the students. The Court's ruling in Barnette, however, was handed
down more than twenty-five years before the Court first started to
recognize that a lower standard of First Amendment protection
may be afforded to public high school students in certain
situations.7  Given that the Supreme Court has consistently
recognized strong First Amendment protection against compelled
speech, lower courts should continue this trend and find a strong
protection against compulsion of student speech. Unlike in the case
68. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1977). The Maynards
claimed that the state motto was in conflict with their "moral, religious, and
political beliefs." Id. at 707.
69. Id. at 714 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 637 (1943)) (emphasis added).
70. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 235 (10th ed.
1998).
71. Barnette was decided in 1943, and Tinker, the first of the student
speech cases, was decided in 1969. See Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) ("First
Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued
that either student or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.").
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of censorship, the fact that the government has several simple
alternatives to compelled speech weighs in favor of finding that
there is more protection against compulsion than there is against
censorship. For instance, the government may avoid First
Amendment concerns by providing the information it seeks to
compel on its own rather than by forcing a speaker to deliver the
• 71
information. Compelled speech may also deserve to be protected
against more than censored speech because compulsion removes
the option of remaining silent.73 Despite the Supreme Court's
recognition of these potential distinctions between compelled and
censored speech, the Tenth Circuit applied the same test to
compelled speech that the Court advanced for censorship cases.
B. Power to Compel Derived from Censorship Policy
After exploring the First Amendment protections against
compelled speech, the Tenth Circuit found that the school district
was free to compel an apology from Corder because the school's
principal had the power to censor her speech in the first place.
74
The court relied heavily on a Third Circuit case to reach this
conclusion. In C.N. v. Ridgewood Board of Education,5 the Third
Circuit found that a survey compiled by community leaders and
administered at three public schools did not violate the students'
First Amendment rights by compelling them to disclose private
information.76
The action was brought by three students who claimed that
the school forced them to participate in a survey of 156 questions
used to gauge students' attitudes and behaviors related to a range
of issues, including alcohol, drugs, sex, and suicide.77 While the
72. See Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 800 (1988)
(suggesting the State publish disclosure forms itself rather than making
fundraisers disclose the same information during a solicitation).
73. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633-34.
74. Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist., 566 F.3d 1219, 1231 (10th Cir.
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 742 (2009).
75. 430 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2005).
76. Id. at 189.
77. Id. at 167-68.
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school claimed that participation in the survey was completely
optional, the Third Circuit found that there was a material issue as
to the voluntariness of the survey."' Nevertheless, the court found
that the students' First Amendment rights were not violated
because there was no compulsion and no disclosure of each
individual student's response, only disclosure of the responses in
the aggregate.79 The court found no compulsion because the
students were not required to adopt a particular viewpoint when
they took the survey; the students were merely expected to choose
among the possible answers. The court also found no disclosure of
the information because survey results were viewed in the
aggregate rather than matched with specific students. "
The Corder court cited two passages in C.N. as its only
support for the proposition that the power to compel an apology
can be derived from the power to censor. In the first passage, the
C.N. court said a school district may compel speech for legitimate
pedagogical purposes."' In the second passage, the C.N. court
noted that the right to refrain from speaking is different in a public
school than in other contexts.82 A reading of C.N. as a whole,
however, does not support the Corder court's reading of C.N. In
C.N., the Third Circuit noted only that there are situations when
compelled speech in schools is permissible, but did not spell out
when these situations occur. 3 In fact, the Third Circuit specifically
stated, "[h]ow far a school may go in compelling speech for what it
views as legitimate pedagogical purposes is a difficult and unsettled
78. Id. at 176. The court looked at several factors when determining that
participation may not have been voluntary: (1) the one student may have been
told that she must take the test while two others were told that they would
receive a "cut" if they did not participate; (2) results showed that there was a
100% participation rate for students in grades seven through twelve; (3) no
parental consent forms were issued; and (4) students were required to stay in
the classroom during the duration of the survey, similar to a test. Id. at 175-76.
79. Id. at 189.
80. Id.
81. Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist., 566 F.3d 1219, 1231 (10th Cir.
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 742 (2009) (citing C.N., 430 F.3d at 178).
82. Id. (citing C.N., 430 F.3d at 186).
83. C.N., 430 F.3d at 178.
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question. We need not explore that question here ...."8 The C.N.
court, therefore, expressly stated that it did not address the issue of
when a school may compel student speech without violating the
First Amendment.
C. Application of the Hazelwood Standard
After reaching its conclusion that the First Amendment
extends the same protections against censorship as it does against
compulsion, the Corder court found that the forced apology, like
the graduation speech, was school-sponsored speech and, thus, the
deferential Hazelwood test applied to the apology:
The imprimatur concept [of the school-
sponsored test] is satisfied because Corder's
apology was directly related to her school-
sponsored speech at the high school
graduation. It occurred close in time after that
graduation ceremony, and was disseminated
through the principal's office via e-mail to the
entire Lewis-Palmer school community. As a
result, the School District was free to compel
Corder's speech as long as the School District's
"decision was 'reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns .... "We give 'substantial
deference' to 'educators' stated pedagogical
concerns."'
85
The Tenth Circuit concluded that Corder's apology was
reasonably related to a pedagogical concern because school officials
needed to ensure that the public did not believe that Corder's
speech reflected the views of the school.8 6 The court further found
that requiring an apology was "related to learning" because it was
the form of discipline required by the school.8  The Corder court
84. Id.
85. Corder, 566 F.3d at 1231 (citations omitted).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1232 ("As we stated in Fleming, the 'universe of legitimate
pedagogical concerns is by no means confined to the academic for it includes
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cited another Tenth Circuit case, as well as an Eighth Circuit case,
to support this conclusion.
In the Tenth Circuit case, Axson-Flynn v. Johnson,89 a
university sought to compel a theatre major to deliver all of the
content of assigned scripts, including certain expletives and
references to God, during her classroom acting exercise."" The
university claimed that it promoted three interests by compelling
the student to perform the pieces as written in this case:
(1) it teaches students how to step outside their
own values and character by forcing them to
assume a very foreign character and to recite
offensive dialogue; (2) it teaches students to
preserve the integrity of the author's work; and
(3) it measures true acting skills to be able
convincingly to portray an offensive part. 9'
The Tenth Circuit indicated that these justifications would
satisfy the Hazelwood standard because the speech was school-
sponsored and the compulsion was related to a legitimate
pedagogical concern; the case, however, was remanded to
determine whether the university's justifications were presented
only to veil religious discrimination.9 ' The Tenth Circuit argued
that it was appropriate to apply Hazelwood, a test that arose out of
a case involving high school students, to compelled speech of
college students.93 The court noted that it was important to weigh
discipline, courtesy, and respect for authority."') (quoting Fleming v. Jefferson
County. Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918, 925 (10th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added)).
88. Corder, 566 F.3d at 1232 (citing Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d
1277, 1292 (10th Cir. 2004) (requiring only that the restrictions under
Hazelwood be reasonable); Wildman v. Marshalltown Sch. Dist., 249 F.3d 768,
771 (8th Cir. 2001) (concluding that there is no constitutional violation in
requiring a student to issue an apology).
89. 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004).
90. Id. at 1282-83.
91. Id. at 1291 (citations omitted).
92. Id. at 1291-93. In this case, a Mormon student argued that the
university's stated purposes for the requirement that students perform the
scripts as written was simply a "pretext for religious discrimination." Id. at
1293.
93. Id. at 1288-90.
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the "[a]ge, maturity, and sophistication level of the students" when
determining if a particular restriction was "reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns."9'4
In Wildman v. Marshalltown School District,9 5 the Eighth
Circuit held that a school could require a student to issue an
apology in order to remain on a sports team after she distributed a
letter to her teammates criticizing the program's coach and using
the word "bullshit." 96 While this case does, in part, support the
notion that a compelled apology may not violate the First
Amendment, the Eighth Circuit did not mention Hazelwood in its
decision. Instead the Wildman court relied on Fraser, finding that
the student's speech was vulgar and offensive because it included an
expletive.97
Furthermore, the Wildman court specifically pointed to two
characteristics of the student's letter that distinguish it from Corder.
First, the Wildman court noted that that case dealt with the
plaintiff's ability to play on a sports team rather than on her
participation in a classroom. 9 Corder did not deal with a classroom
activity either, but the school district required that the valedictorian
issue the apology in order to receive her diploma.99 Thus, the
punishment in Corder certainly was a more serious punishment
than that in Wildman, which involved participation in a non-
academic, extracurricular activity. Second, the speech for which the
school district sought an apology in Wildman was profane,""
whereas Corder was expressing her religious views. Punishing
profane language may be less offensive to the First Amendment
than punishing religious speech, because religious speech is
considered at the core of First Amendment protection. "" For these
94. Id. at 1289.
95. 249 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2001).
96. Id. at 770, 772.
97. Id. at 771.
98. Id. at 772.
99. Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist., 566 F.3d 1219, 1223 (10th Cir.
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 742 (2009).
100. Wildman, 249 F.3d at 771.
101. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) ("A system which
secures the right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must
2010]
reasons, there is more justification for allowing the compelled
speech in Wildman than there is in Corder.
The Wildman court also discussed a Tenth Circuit case in
which the court came to a much different conclusion about the
constitutionality of compelling an apology." 2  In Seamons v.
Snow,"3 the Tenth Circuit held that there was a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the First Amendment was violated when
a high school football coach required a player to apologize for
reporting a locker room assault to the police in order to rejoin the
team." In this case, the Tenth Circuit never addressed the general
issue of whether it is constitutionally permissible for a school
district to compel an apology, but seemed to indicate that if the
student's apology in this case was compelled, such a compulsion
would have violated the student's First Amendment rights.15 The
Seamons court cited Hazelwood as precedent for lesser First
Amendment protections for student speech, but noted that
"extensive case law in 1993 [when the incident took place]
supported the proposition that school authorities may not penalize
students for their speech when that speech is non-disruptive, non-
also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts."). See
Laycock, supra note 24, at 123-24.
102. See Wildman, 249 F.3d at 772 (distinguishing the facts from Seamons
v. Snow, 206 F.3d 1021 (10th Cir. 2000)).
103. 206 F.3d 1021 (10th Cir. 2000).
104. Id. at 1024 (holding that summary judgment was not properly
granted based on the facts and remanding the claim on the First Amendment
issue).
105. Id. at 1028. The Tenth Circuit noted:
In summary, there are genuine issues of material fact as to
whether Coach Snow required Brian to apologize as a
condition of remaining on the team. There is a disputed
question as to the scope of the apology Coach Snow asked
Brian to give. Finally, there is an issue as to whether
Brian's suspension and dismissal from the team were the
result of his refusal to apologize. Considering all of the
facts and drawing all inferences in the light most favorable
to Brian, we conclude there is evidence to support his
First Amendment claim against Coach Snow.
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obscene, and not school-sponsored." 11"6 This statement indicates
that the Tenth Circuit in this case did not believe that compelled
apology of the student athlete in Seamons was "school-sponsored"
within the meaning of the Hazelwood standard. The Tenth Circuit
in Corder, however, never addressed that same court's holding in
Seamons. If it had, it may have been more likely to find that
compelling the apology violated the First Amendment.
It is clear that the Tenth Circuit failed to lay a solid
foundation for its finding that the school district in Corder did not
violate the First Amendment by compelling an apology.
Specifically, the Corder court misinterpreted Supreme Court
precedent to support its finding that the First Amendment provides
the same protection against compelled and censored speech. The
Corder court incorrectly found that the power to compel can be
derived from the power to censor. Finally, the Corder court
incorrectly applied a standard used to assess the constitutionality of
censored speech to the compelled apology.
While there is no case law that directly contradicts the
Tenth Circuit's holding in Corder, the court's decision to apply the
deferential Hazelwood test was crucial to its finding that the First
Amendment was not violated. If the court had applied a stricter
test to the speech, it seems clear that the school district's policy
would not have passed constitutional muster. Without case law
directly on point to support the application of the Hazelwood
standard, the Tenth Circuit should have examined the nature and
content of the compelled speech to discern the appropriate test. If
the court had done this, certain characteristics of the compelled
speech in Corder would have pointed to increased First
Amendment protection.
D. Distinguishing Characteristics of the Compelled Speech in
Corder
After finding the same First Amendment protections
against compelled and censored speech, the Corder court assumed
that the deferential Hazelwood standard applied to Corder's
106. Id. at 1030.
2010]
compelled apology because the court applied that standard to the
censorship issue. 7 The Tenth Circuit never discussed certain
distinguishing characteristics of the compelled apology that support
the notion that the court should have recognized a stronger First
Amendment protection for Corder. Specifically, the court failed to
discuss the inherent differences between the power to censor
speech and the power to compel it, the differences between
compelling a response and compelling the adoption of a particular
viewpoint, and the special harms brought about by compelling
speech.
1. Inherent differences between the powers to censor and compel
The difference between censorship and compulsion is clear
when looking at the available alternatives. A censored party has
the option to remain silent or reframe his or her point to comply
with the censorship restrictions; a compelled party is required to
make statements that reflect the beliefs or opinions of another
party and has no alternative. In Corder, the school district had
other options to distance itself from the Corder's message after
graduation. Similarly, the school district could have punished
Corder for presenting an unapproved version of her speech in a
host of ways without implicating the First Amendment concerns
raised by compelled speech. For instance, the school could have
made a notation in her permanent record or required her to
complete detention for violating a school policy. These available
alternatives bolster the view that compelled student speech should
be given greater protection than that afforded through an
application of the Supreme Court student speech cases.
The Supreme Court has advanced several reasons for
affording lesser First Amendment protections to student speech in
a school setting, including avoiding a material interference or a
substantial disruption with school activities,1" curtailing sexually
107. Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist., 566 F.3d 1219, 1232 (10th Cir.
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 742 (2009).
108. Tinker v. Des Moines [ndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.. 393 U.S. 503, 514
(1969).
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suggestive speech," 9 restricting speech that advocates drug use, IM
and controlling the message of speech that might be confused as
school-endorsed.' It is clear that only the last justification applies
in Corder.
The school district asserted that it required Corder to
apologize because it was concerned that the public would believe
the graduation speech reflected the views of the school.
112
However, there was a simple solution to this problem, one that
would not offend the First Amendment: the school district could
have written and disseminated to the school community a statement
clarifying that it did not approve Corder's speech. After all, the
school district itself was the entity that actually approved, altered,
and sent out Corder's apology via e-mail." 3
The Corder court also expressed the belief that, at least
under the Hazelwood standard, it is permissible for a school to use
compelled speech to punish students." 14 In support of its finding
that compelling the speech was constitutionally permissible, the
Corder court quoted Fleming, stating the "universe of legitimate
pedagogical concerns ... includes discipline, courtesy, and respect
for authority.""' 5  The court failed to note that this language in
Fleming was a direct quote from a Sixth Circuit opinion in which
that court noted specifically that the case was about censorship and
not about compulsion.1 6 Both of these cases cited in support of its
finding on the compelled speech issue can be distinguished from
Corder because they dealt with the issue of censored, rather than
compelled, speech."' In fact, the Sixth Circuit in Poling v.
109. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
110. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408 (2007).
111. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
112. Corder, 566 F.3d at 1231.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1232.
115. Id. (quoting Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d
918, 925 (10th Cir. 2002)).
116. See id. at 1232; Fleming, 298 F.3d at 925.
117. See Fleming, 298 F.3d 918 (holding school guidelines for selection of
tiles that would be affixed to the walls of Columbine High School after the
school shooting did not violate the First Amendment rights of the parties
involved in decorating the tiles); Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757 (6th Cir.
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Murphy' specifically noted that "[i]t is important to bear in mind,
we think, that the school officials made no attempt to compel [the
student] to say anything he did not want to say."'' School districts
could use other methods to punish students without compelling
speech.
2. Compelled speech requiring the adoption of a particular
viewpoint
In C.N., an opinion cited in the Corder decision as the basis
for the notion that the power to compel can be derived from the
power to censor, the Third Circuit pointed out that all forms of
government-imposed compelled speech trigger a First Amendment
analysis. "" The level of scrutiny applied, however, changes
depending upon whether the government is compelling the speaker
to adopt a certain viewpoint.' 2 ' The Supreme Court has explained
that content-based speech restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny,
while content-neutral speech restrictions are subject to a more
deferential test.122 In justifying this distinction, the Court said:
Laws that compel speakers to utter or
distribute speech bearing a particular message
are subject to the same rigorous scrutiny [as
content-based restrictions]. In contrast,
regulations that are unrelated to the content of
speech are subject to an intermediate level of
scrutiny, because in most cases they pose a less
substantial risk of excising certain ideas or
viewpoints from the public dialogue. 1
23
1989) (holding that a school district did not violate a student's First
Amendment rights when the district removed him from a school election
because he made disparaging comments about the school's assistant principal
during a campaign speech).
118. 872 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1989).
119. Id. at 763.
120. C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 187-88 (3d Cir. 2005).
121. Id. at 188.
122. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-42 (1994).
123. Id. at 642 (citations omitted).
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While C.N, the case dealing with the student survey, recognizes that
there are scenarios in which a school may compel student speech
without violating the First Amendment, the Third Circuit does little
to clarify when this may occur, particularly when the government is
not only compelling speech but also forcing the adoption of a
particular viewpoint. 
12 4
It has been widely accepted by the courts that compelled
speech is permissible in some educational contexts. For example, a
teacher may require a student to write a research paper on a
specific paper topic or require that a student advocate a particular
viewpoint in the course of a classroom debate to develop critical
thinking skills. '25 In Corder, however, the apology was clearly not
related to a classroom exercise. The facts of Corder demonstrate
the two types of compelled student speech described by Seana
Valentine Shiffrin, a UCLA School of Law professor.' 6  She
explained that compelled student speech cases should be divided
into two categories based on the type of speech involved: compelled
recitations, like the Pledge of Allegiance, and "mandatory
education efforts," like classroom exercises designed to teach.'27
Shriffin argued that compelled speech in the context of educational
classroom exercises should be permitted under the First
Amendment while compelled recitations usually violate the First
Amendment.'2 She argued that the mandatory education efforts
are less troubling from a constitutional perspective because the
teacher in that situation is attempting to help students think
critically and "arrive at conclusions that are truly their own,"' 29
rather than showing an indifference for students' judgments.13)
124. C.N., 430 F.3d at 178.
125. See id.; see also Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1290-91
(10th Cir. 2004).
126. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What Is Really Wrong With Compelled
Association?, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 839, 883-85 (2005).
127. Id. at 883.
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Certainly, the compelled apology in Corder can be likened
to a compelled recitation, because the apology was not designed to
help Corder arrive at her own independent conclusion about the
incident. It was required to punish her and to inform members of
the community that the school district did not approve her speech.
Moreover, the school district in Corder not only required the
valedictorian to draft and issue an apology, but also required that
she add an additional sentence to her draft. If she failed to comply
with this requirement, the principal said, she would not receive her
diploma. 3' In this way, the school district required Corder to adopt
a particular viewpoint-that mentioning Jesus Christ in her
graduation speech was wrong-and to issue a statement to that
effect. This requirement is troubling from a First Amendment
perspective: not only was Corder forced to advance a specific
position, but the policy showed little regard for her personal
development as well.
3. Special harms caused by compelled speech
In its discussion of the compelled speech issue, the Tenth
Circuit never considered the harm that might be caused by
requiring Corder to issue an apology. Legal scholars posit that First
Amendment protections against compelled speech are essential
because of potential speaker-based, listener-based, and society-
based harms caused by the compulsion. 3 ' Courts have traditionally
adopted speaker-based considerations in determining whether the
First Amendment prohibits compelled speech.'33 Nevertheless,
131. Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist., 566 F.3d 1219, 1223 (10th Cir.
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 742 (2009).
132. See, e.g., Laurent Sacharoff, Listener Interests in Compelled Speech
Cases, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 329, 330-33 (2008) (arguing that courts should
adopt a listener-based analysis rather than the traditional speaker-based
analysis); Shiffrin, supra note 126 (arguing that compelled speech violates the
First Amendment because of harms that it causes to the speaker and to
society). But see, e.g., Larry Alexander, Compelled Speech, 23 CONST.
COMMENT. 147 (2006) (arguing that compelled speech does not cause any
harm and, thus, should not be afforded First Amendment protection).
133. See Sacharoff, supra note 132, at 337-60 (tracing the courts' focus on
the "freedom of mind" justification in compelled speech cases).
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compelled speech like that in Corder might give rise to listener-
based and society-based harms as well.
Compelled speech raises two major concerns from a
speaker-based perspective. Compelled speech might interfere with
a speaker's freedom of thought and might conflict with the virtue of
sincerity. 34 In the context of religious speech, concerns about a
speaker's freedom of thought are particularly significant. Thomas
Emerson, a former Yale University law professor, noted, "Early
struggles for freedom of the mind centered around religious
freedom, and legal protection for freedom of belief has developed
most explicitly and most extensively in this area."' 35 In Wooley, the
Supreme Court clarified, "The First Amendment protects the right
of individuals to hold a point of view different from the majority
and to refuse to foster . . . an idea they find morally
objectionable."' 3 6 The Court further noted that the freedom of the
mind is protected through the First Amendment protections of
"[t]he right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking."'3
Freedom to develop one's religious beliefs includes the freedom to
discuss these beliefs unapologetically. This should be particularly
true for high school students, who are at an age when they are likely
to be searching for their own religious truths. Forcing a student to
apologize for discussing her religious views interferes with that
student's freedom of mind and may influence her feelings about her
beliefs.
More generally, the virtue of sincerity is also an important
consideration in Corder, where the valedictorian was forced to issue
an apology. The search for the truth is one of the main
134. Shiffrin, supra note 126, at 853-54. Shiffrin argued that "what one
regularly says may have an influence on what and how one thinks," and
because compelled speech is delivered without rational deliberation by the
speaker, it is particularly dangerous. Id. at 855. Shiffrin further stated that
sincerity is one of the "character virtues that [is] reasonably precious to
citizens, both as individuals and as First Amendment actors," and that
compelling speech undermines this value. Id. at 860.
135. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 23
(1970).
136. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977).
137. Id. at 714.
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justifications for the First Amendment. This process is distorted
when government forces citizens to say what they do not believe, or
to apologize for making statements they do not regret. 3 " While
there are certainly instances when sincerity is not required, Shiffrin
explained that the "widespread deployment of a general virtue of
sincerity is integral to a successful First Amendment culture."' 9
Certainly, the government should advance this virtue in instances
where people are simply expressing their religious beliefs.
In addition to potential harms to the speaker, listener-based
interests are always triggered in compelled speech cases. Most
broadly, listeners have an interest in understanding the source of
the information they receive.141' For instance, parties who received
Corder's message might have evaluated it differently if they were
aware that she only issued the apology in order to receive her
diploma. Another problem with compelled speech is that it allows
the government to bolster the "perceived social acceptance of its
message."' 4 1 In Corder, the government may purport to be
punishing Corder for delivering a version of her speech that was not
approved by the principal, but this leaves open the possibility that
listeners will view the forced apology as a condemnation of her
religious views. Furthermore, listeners may believe that Corder's
religious views should be considered offensive or that the majority
of people in the community were offended. After all, she was
forced to apologize for her speech and explicitly made reference in
138. See Shiffrin, supra note 126, at 862.
139. Id. at 863. Shiffrin explained that sincerity is not always necessary,
noting, "There is, obviously, room for humor, pretense, sarcasm, and
exaggeration." Id.
140. Sacharoff, supra note 132, at 401-02. Sacharoff also noted that
compelled speech leads to a "distortion of the total mix of information." Id. at
385. He stated that this happens in a number of ways, including through
misattribution where the listener alters the weight that he or she gives to
information based on the identity of the speaker, through the government's
ability to use compulsion as a form of free advertising for its viewpoint, and
through group ritual and recitation where the government is able to amplify its
own message. Id. at 385-400.
141. Id. at 401.
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her apology to the fact that members of the community may have
objected to her speech. 142
In addition to these speaker- and listener-based concerns,
there are broader societal interests that run counter to permitting
compelled speech, particularly based on the facts of Corder.
Emerson states that free expression serves three societal functions
in a democracy, two of which are jeopardized by compelled speech.
Emerson defines the central purposes of the First Amendment as
facilitating the discovery of the truth 143 and ensuring a stable
community. '44
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes pointed out the paramount
importance of the free exchange of ideas in the search for the truth:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset
many fighting faiths, they may come to believe
even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas- that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market, and that truth is
the only ground upon which their wishes safely
can be carried out.
1 45
In Corder, forcing an apology reflected little respect for the
value of truthful information. It is hard to believe that Corder was
genuinely apologetic for talking about her personal religious
142. Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist., 566 F.3d 1219, 1223 (10th Cir.
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 742 (2009).
143. See EMERSON, supra note 135, at 6-7 ("Discussion must be kept
open no matter how certainly true an accepted opinion may seem to be; many
of the most widely acknowledged truths have turned out to be erroneous.").
144. See id. at 7 ("[S]uppression of discussion makes a rational judgment
impossible, substituting force for reason .... "). In addition to these two
societal functions, Emerson noted that free expression is important to all
members of society to participate in the decision-making process. Id.
Emerson also noted that there is a fourth, individual function to free
expression: namely to assure individual self-fulfillment. Id. at 6.
145. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
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beliefs. 46 Instead, the school district's demand that she issue an
apology advanced a view that the free exchange of ideas was not
essential. This is particularly troubling from a society-based
perspective because public high schools are fora in which students
seek constantly to define and understand themselves and the world
around them. A policy that requires a student to apologize for her
personal religious beliefs does little to protect the value of truthful
information in the marketplace of ideas.
Emerson also argued that the First Amendment is
important because it enables society to change peacefully. This is
based on the notion that "freedom of expression is a method of
achieving a more adaptable and hence a more stable community, of
maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and
necessary consensus."' 147 In Corder, the school district did not
recognize the value of allowing a student to express her personal
beliefs; instead, it sought to punish Corder. Forcing a person to
apologize after expressing religious views has dangerous
implications; people who feel that their religious views were
suppressed and punished may resort to less peaceful means of
displaying their dissatisfaction for these policies.
While the school district would most likely argue that it
compelled Corder's apology to discipline her for concealing the
true text of her speech during the, approval process, it still seems
that compelling an apology is an inappropriate punishment. If the
practice of compelling apologies for religious speech in cases where
a school district had the power to censor speech became
widespread, this would likely spark controversy and possibly even
violence.
Because there was no Supreme Court precedent that dealt
directly with compelled speech in schools in the wake of the Court's
decision on the student speech cases, the Corder court drew on
several opinions to apply a censored-student-speech rule to the
146. Corder explained, "I really felt God calling me to do this. My top
priority is obeying God." Sarah Burnett, Valedictorian Who Touted Jesus Sues
Over Feud, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Colo.), Aug. 31, 2007,
http://www.rockymountainnews.com/drmn/local/article/0,1299,DRMN15568
6493,00.html.
147. See EMERSON, supra note 135, at 7.
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issue of compelled student speech. The foundation of the Tenth
Circuit's opinion is shaky, however, and the court should have
considered distinguishing factors when examining the facts in
Corder. Specifically, if the court looked at the inherent differences
between the powers to censor and compel, the requirement that
Corder adopt a particular viewpoint, and the special harms caused
by compelled speech, the court would have found that compelling
the apology violated the First Amendment.
11. CONCLUSION
In Barnette, the Supreme Court announced famously, "[i]f
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."' 148 It follows
logically that the government should not constitutionally be able to
force a student to issue an apology for expressing her religious
views. The Tenth Circuit in Corder adopted a divergent view on
the issue of compelled student speech and failed to justify
convincingly the application of a constitutional test that was
extremely deferential to the government censors. The Corder court
even noted that it adopted a deferential approach when evaluating
an educator's conclusion as to what type of concerns meet this
threshold. 149 The Tenth Circuit ultimately found that the compelled
apology in Corder was constitutionally permissible because the
apology was "'related to learning" '' and because the compelled
apology furthered the school's interest in ensuring that people did
not attribute Corder's words to the school.'5 '
The Tenth Circuit's view of this issue suggests that it is
permissible under the First Amendment for the government to
compel an apology in other situations in which it has the power to
148. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
149. Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist., 566 F.3d 1219, 1231 (10th Cir.
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 742 (2009).
150. Id. at 1232 (quoting Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298
F.3d 918, 925 (10th Cir. 2002)).
151. Id. at 1231.
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censor. For example, the government could compel an apology
from a publisher of obscene material'52 or from an enlisted person
who violates the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. 5 3
Beyond that, it is possible that courts could apply this same
standard in situations where the government does not have the
power to censor but does have the power to restrict speech, for
example, through time, place, and manner restrictions. 54 Thus, a
city could compel an apology from a protestor who violated a
constitutional ordinance restricting speech in a public forum. ,55 If
the Tenth Circuit had recognized the distinguishing characteristics
of the compelled speech in Corder and the implications of its
decision, it would likely have applied a standard that provided more
First Amendment protection against compelled speech.
It is clear from Supreme Court precedent that compelled
speech is guarded against through full First Amendment
protection. 156 The Court, however, has also recognized that, due to
the "special characteristics of the school environment," students
may have less First Amendment protection than adults would have
in a different setting.'57 These conflicting precedents caused trouble
for the courts when determining the appropriate standard for
152. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (explaining that the
First Amendment does not protect obscene material).
153. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2) (2009) (permitting the discharge of an
enlisted person who "has stated that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual, or
words to that effect").
154. See 16A AM. JUR. 2D Const. Law § 534 (2009) ("[T]he government
may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected
speech, provided that the restrictions are content-neutral, that they are
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they
leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information.").
155. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (upholding the
constitutionality of an ordinance that prohibited sound trucks from
broadcasting on public streets in a "loud and raucous manner"). In these
situations, courts might apply an intermediate scrutiny analysis so it is less
likely that a compelled apology would be found to be constitutional. The
Corder opinion does, however, leave the door open for this type of analysis.
156. See discussion supra Part II.A.
157. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969).
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compelled student speech. Shiffrin's distinction between compelled
recitations and "mandatory education" efforts is useful in
determining the appropriate standard.15' In particular, Shiffrin's
concepts can be used to establish a framework that courts should
use to analyze future compelled student speech cases.
Shiffrin argues that compelled recitations in a school setting,
like the Pledge of Allegiance, are particularly troubling from a First
Amendment perspective because they offer no opportunity for
students to think critically about what they are saying. 59 Consistent
with this concern, the Supreme Court held that forcing students to
recite the Pledge of Allegiance violated the First Amendment in
Barnette.' 60 In cases of compelled recitations at schools, courts
should apply Barnette, the only Supreme Court case dealing with
the issue of compelled student speech, and grant students full First
Amendment protection against compelled speech because this type
of speech does nothing to aid in the educational process.
Generally, it is clear from Supreme Court precedent that
adults are given full First Amendment protection against compelled
speech. 6 ' Notably, in Wooley, the Supreme Court held that the
First Amendment precluded a state from requiring Jehovah's
Witnesses to display the state's motto on their license places. The
Court explained, "The First Amendment protects the right of
individuals to hold a point of view different from the majority and
to refuse to foster ... an idea they find morally objectionable.' ' 61
Once the Wooley Court assessed the First Amendment concerns, it
also identified the government's interest in placing the state motto
on license plates and considered whether the "countervailing
interest is sufficiently compelling" to justify the regulation.16 ' The
Court held that the government's interests in "(1) facilitat[ing] the
identification of passenger vehicles, and (2) promot[ing]
158. See Shiffrin, supra note 126, at 884-85.
159. Id. at 884.
160. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
161. See discussion supra Part II.A.
162. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977).
163. Id. at 716.
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appreciation of history, individualism, and state pride" were
insufficient to overcome the Maynards' First Amendment claims. 6
The balancing test in Wooley is the appropriate standard for
assessing whether the First Amendment protects against compelled
speech in a particular situation because it considers both the free
expression concerns of the individual and the government's
interest. This test is more stringent than the one applied by Corder,
which only required that the compelled apology be "reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns," a test the court
acknowledged was extremely deferential to the school officials.165
Regardless of these compelled speech concerns, the Court
also noted in subsequent opinions that there is less First
Amendment protection for students in some situations. 6 6 Shiffrin
argued that compelled speech may be permissible during
"mandatory education" efforts. In these situations, teachers use
compelled speech to help students develop their critical thinking
skills and form their own opinions. 16  Because such exercises-
requiring a student to argue a particular side in a debate or
assigning a research paper topic-show concern for the
development of a student's judgment, Shiffrin found them less
offensive to the First Amendment than compelled recitations.
68
In light of Supreme Court precedent in the compelled
speech cases and the Court's recognition of public schools as a
special setting, courts should adopt the Wooley balancing test for
compelled student speech cases that do not involve a compelled
recitation. In particular, the court should first consider whether
First Amendment concerns are raised, keeping in mind that the
First Amendment protects against the government's compulsion of
speech. The court should then balance any potential First
Amendment concerns against the government's interest in
compelling student speech. The court should consider, as it did in
164. Id.
165. Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist., 566 F.3d 1219, 1231-32 (10th Cir.
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 742 (2009) (quoting Fleming v. Jefferson County
Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 926 (10th Cir. 2002)).
166. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682-83 (1986).
167. See Shiffrin, supra note 126, at 884.
168. Id.
Wooley, whether the government's interest is "sufficiently
compelling" to overcome the First Amendment concerns. Because
the Court has noted that public school students may be given fewer
First Amendment protections, courts should recognize an exception
to the application of the Wooley rule in situations involving
"mandatory education" efforts. In these situations, Courts should
permit compelled speech because mandatory education efforts are
designed to encourage students to think through problems and
reach their own conclusions. Allowing for this exception recognizes
the special mission of schools to teach children.
In summary, courts should apply the following scheme to
compelled student speech cases. In cases involving compelled
recitations, courts should follow Barnette and strike down such
policies on First Amendment grounds. In cases involving
"mandatory education" efforts, courts should allow a school's
compelled speech requirement to stand in order to give teachers
enough power to teach critical thinking skills. In all other cases
involving compelled student speech, courts should apply the
balancing test used in Wooley. The court must determine whether
the compelled speech raises First Amendment concerns, and then
the court must balance those concerns, if any, against the
government's interest. In order to pass constitutional muster, the
government's interest must be "sufficiently compelling" to
outweigh any First Amendment concerns.
If the Wooley test had been applied in Corder, it is likely
that the Tenth Circuit would have found that the school district's
requirement that Corder issue an apology violated the First
Amendment. Clearly, the compelled apology raises free expression
concerns since the First Amendment protects "the decision of both
what to say and what not to say."' 169 The school district identified
two interests advanced by the compelled apology in Corder. The
school district claimed that the apology clarified the fact that the
school did not approve the graduation speech, and the school
district claimed the apology was a form of punishment. Under the
standard established in Wooley, these government interests are not
"sufficiently compelling" to overcome the First Amendment
169. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988).
2010] INSINCERE A POLO0GIES 569
concerns raised by the compelled apology. In Wooley, the Court
noted that "'even though the governmental purpose be legitimate
and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be
more narrowly achieved."' ' " The same reasoning is true in Corder
since the school district had several available alternatives that it
could have employed to advance its interests. For these reasons,
the compelled apology in Corder would have been found to violate
the First Amendment if the court had applied the Wooley standard.
Adopting the proposed standards for compelled student
speech cases will make it more difficult for schools to compel
student speech outside of typical curricular activities in a classroom
setting. This stricter standard is appropriate, however, because
public schools are places where society, and the law, should not
allow students to be forced to apologize for exploring and
expressing their beliefs. After all, it is through this process that
students learn how to become active, engaged, and self-aware
members of society. Compelling apologies from students who
simply reflect their personal beliefs is not only unnecessary, but is
likely to have negative effects on the speaker, the listener, and
society as a whole. Courts should be skeptical of schools that
compel student speech outside of a curricular activity, particularly
for disciplinary purposes, and take one step toward fully protecting
this "fixed star in our constitutional constellation." 1
71
170. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716 (1977) (quoting Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)).
171. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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